Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ICIS 1989 Proceedings

International Conference on Information Systems
(ICIS)

1989

COMPREHENSIVENESS AND
RESTRICTIVENESS IN GROUP DECISION
HEURISTICS: EFFECTS OF COMPUTER
SUPPORT ON CONSENSUS DECISION
MAKING
Gerardlne DeSanctis
University of Minnesota

Marianne J. D'Onorrio
Central Connecticut State University

V. Sambamurthy
Florida State University

Marshall Scott Poole
University of Minnesota

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1989
Recommended Citation
DeSanctis, Gerardlne; D'Onorrio, Marianne J.; Sambamurthy, V.; and Poole, Marshall Scott, "COMPREHENSIVENESS AND
RESTRICTIVENESS IN GROUP DECISION HEURISTICS: EFFECTS OF COMPUTER SUPPORT ON CONSENSUS
DECISION MAKING" (1989). ICIS 1989 Proceedings. 43.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/icis1989/43

This material is brought to you by the International Conference on Information Systems (ICIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted
for inclusion in ICIS 1989 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact
elibrary@aisnet.org.

COMPREHENSIVENESS AND RESTRICTIVENESS IN GROUP
DECISION HEURISTICS: EFFECTS OF COMPUTER
SUPPORT ON CONSENSUS DECISION MAKING
Gerardine DeSanctis
University of Minnesota
Marianne J. D'Onorrio
Central Connecticut State University

V. Sambamurthy

Florida State University
Marshall Scott Poole
University of Minnesota

ABSTRACT
The application of heuristic devices has been proposed as one approach to improving consensus
decision making. The heuristics are intended to provide problem structuring and, more broadly, to
improve the process of interpersonal collaboration in work settings. This study drew from research on
group decision making (e.g., Shaw 1971; Poole 1983), problem structuring (e.g., Abualsamh, Carlin and
McDaniel in press; Cats-Baril and Huber 1987), computer-mediated communication (e.g., Kiesler,
Siegel and McGuire 1987), and technology adoption (e.g., Poole and DeSanctis 1989) to compare
alternative approaches to delivery of decision heuristics for a task requiring resolution of competing
values and preferences. Based on the arguments of adaptive structuration theory and social judgment
theory, we hypothesized that the addition of a general heuristic to a specific, computer-based heuristic
would improve group consensus; that is, the greater the comprehensiveness of the heuristic, the greater
the gain in consensus. We further anticipated that combining general and specific heuristics in an
integrated, interactive form would bring additional gains in group consensus. Greater restrictiveness in
how the groups could execute the heuristic devices was also expected to improve group consensus,
especially in cases where the specific heuristic was not coupled with the general heuristic. The results
supported some of these predictions. By comparing heuristics in terms of their comprehensiveness and
restrictiveness, we developed some understanding of how decision heuristics might be implemented

within a computer-supported meeting environment.
1.

INTRODUCTION

offers several types of heuristics: low or high comprehen-

sive; restrictive and nonrestrictive; divergent and converConsensus decisions are judgments for which there are no

gent. The current study varied the first two dimensions in

'correct' solutions but only more or less acceptable

a computerized meeting environment to address two
questions: (1) does the effectiveness of a more comprehensive (specific) heuristic improve when it is coupled with a

outcomes (McGrath 1984). For these types of decisions,
objective measures rarely exist, leaving organizations to

recognize only relatively good or relatively bad decisions,
with little refinement in knowledge of quality (Van de Ven
and Delbecq 1974). Examples include selection among a
list of candidates for a job, prioritization of organizational
goals, or allocation of surplus resources. These are

less comprehensive (general) heuristic, yielding a highly

comprehensive heuristic? (2) does greater restrictiveness
in the implementation of heuristics improve their impact
on consensus? and (3) does the effect of restrictiveness
vary as a function of comprehensiveness? Based on the
arguments of adaptive structuration theory (Poole and
DeSanctis 1989) and social judgment theory (Stewart and
Gelberd 1976), we hypothesized that coupling a general
heuristic with a specific heuristic, to yield a highly comprehensive heuristic, would improve group consensus. We

judgment tasks that frequently involve resolution of value

differences among individuals or organizational units.
The application of heuristic devices has been proposed as
one approach to improving consensus decision making.

Development and evaluation of group decision heuristics

further anticipated that presenting general and specific
heuristics in an integrated, interactive form would bring
additional gains in group consensus, and that greater

has yielded a rich research literature (e.g., Cosier 1982;
Hall and Watson 1970; Herbert and Yost 1979; Rodrigues
1984; Rohrbaugh 1981; Van Gundy 1981). This literature

restrictiveness in how the groups could execute the
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heuristic devices would improve group consensus.

By

The Consensus Approach as outlined by Hall and Watson

(1970) exemplifies a general, or less comprehensive,
heuristic for consensus decision making. It emphasizes a
spirit of participation and tolerance, encouraging diver-

comparing heuristics along these dimensions, we hoped to

determine how consensus tasks might be structured and,
more generally, to develop some understanding of how
decision heuristics might be implemented within a computer-supported meeting environment.

gence in group thinking. Group members are advised to

openly state their viewpoints and be tolerant of one
another, but the heuristic gives no specific instructions on

the process for group discussion or the structure of
argumentation; that is, the heuristic provides few explicit

2.

structural features.

HEURISTICS AND CONSENSUS DECISION
MAKING

Well known specific heuristics that are high in comprehensiveness and emphasize the group's use of specific struct-

According to behavioral decision theorists, people apply
"rules of thumb" -- intuitively or socially acquired heuristics

-- to guide their choices and actions.

ural features, include Rational Reflection (Dewey 1910;
McBurney and Hance 1939; Barnlund and Haiman 1960),

Unfortunately,

people often apply ineffective rules of thumb to decision
situations, thus failing to meet their desires of rationality

the Nominal Group Technique (Van de Ven and Delbecq
1974),the Delphi Method (Dalkey 1972), the Noninteractional method (Rodrigues 1984), Strategic Assumptions

(Frank 1987). In the group setting, the application of
ineffective heuristics has been well documented (Janis
1972; Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974). In the case of

Surfacing and Testing (Mason and Mitroff 1981), and
Social Judgment Analysis (Rohrbaugh 1981). In recent

consensus decision tasks, decision theorists propose that

years, comprehensive heuristics such as these have begun
to be embedded in computer software systems intended for

groups can solve complex problems more effectively if their
discussion includes high member participation and a
decision-making structure (Becker and Baloff 1969;

use by groups during decision making (e.g., DeSanctis,
Sambamurthy and Watson 1987; Nunamaker, Applegate

Holloman and Hendrick 1972; Shaw 1971). They propose
that groups be give supplemental heuristics that structure

and Konsynski 1988).

information generation and handling during the decision
process (Holloman and Hendrick 1972). Thorough
evaluation and critiques of inferences and assumptions are

In addition to their comprehensiveness, heuristics can also
be distinguished in terms of their rest,ictiveness.

A group

decision heuristic is restrictive to the extent that it limits,
or channels, the group's use of the resources inherent in
the heuristic (Silver 1988): The heuristic is highly restric-

considered essential to an effective group process (Janis

1972; Stewart and Gelberd 1976).

tive if the structural features are sequenced and instruction
is given on their execution; the heuristic actively excludes
the use of other (and presumably less effective) approaches

A variety of heuristics, or decision techniques, have been
proposed for use in group consensus tasks (see Van Gundy
1981). Although these could be described in terms of the
specific advice that they provide to groups, they are more

to managing the decision process. When heuristics are

restrictive, group members are less likely to bring old ways

meaningfully distinguished in terms of two fundamental
dimensions: comprehensiveness and restrictiveness.

of behaving or rules of thumb to bear when applying the
heuristic. Alternatively, if the heuristic is less restrictive,
then it is implemented in an open-ended fashion; structural

Comprehensiveness refers to how general or specific is the
structure provided by the heuristic. The heuristic repre-

features are made available to the group, but the members
are left to their own devices to determine exactly how the
features are to be implemented during group discussion.

sents a resource, in the form of a structure for group
process, and this resource may vary in the degree of
specific support activities that it provides to the group.
Adaptive structuration theory, a theory of technology
adoption, defines these aspects as the heuristic's "spirit," or

The degree of restrictiveness is not so much a characteristic of the heuristic itself as its implementation. That
is, the Consensus Approach, the Nominal Group Technique, and Social Judgment Analysis may be more or less

general ends and attitudes the heuristic aims to promote,
and its "structural features," which are the particular set of
activities or capabilities that the heuristic provides (Poole
1983; Poole and DeSanctis 1989). A general heuristic

restrictive depending on the degree to which group

emphasizes a philosophy of decision-making and is limited

There is ample evidence that groups can benefit from the
structure provided by heuristics. Indeed it appears that
even a modest addition of structure to the decision process
helps to overcome some of the difficulties associated with
natural, "free interacting" groups (Smith 1973). However,
there is less conclusive evidence on the relative effectiveness of available heuristics or on the importance of the

members can opt to execute the features in a particular
sequence or fashion or to ignore them altogether.

in the particular advice it gives to decision makers (Abual-

samh, Carlin and McDaniel in press; Cats-Baril and Huber
1987). A specific heuristic emphasizes the particular
structural features and instructs the decision makers to
apply a specific set of activities during the decision process.
A given heuristic may contain both general and specific

dimensions of comprehensiveness and restrictiveness. As
group decision heuristics become embedded into computer

elements, but the heuristic tends to stress one aspect over
the other.
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systems, questions arise about what heuristics should be
included in these systems and how they should be presented to users. Given that group members are faced with
a consensus decision, should they employ a general or a
specific heuristic, or both? a more restrictive heuristic or
a less restrictive heuristic? In other words, how do
comprehensiveness and restrictiveness in heuristics affect

group consensus?
problem.

One proposed approach for facilitating adoption of
comprehensive heuristics has been the use of computer
programs during group discussion (DeSanctis and Gallupe
1987; Huber 1984). The hope is that interactive computing
may ease application of the heuristics, obviating the need
for a group facilitator or special training in the heuristic
(Dickson et al. 1989). Computing can take over some of
the computational burdens associated with specific structural features (such as recursive voting or calculation of
group judgment scores) and provide groups with rapid
feedback on the ideas of individuals and where individuals

Our study aimed to examine this

stand with respect to the group's judgments. Despite these

3.

potential advantages, the research to date is disappointing
with respect to the actual benefits realized with computer

HYPOTHESIZED EFFECTS OF HEURISTICS

There is reason to expect that certain general heuristics,

delivery of heuristics. Several studies have found no
advantage of computers over paper and pencil as a delivery
method for specific heuristics (Cats-Baril and Huber 1987;
Easton, Vogel and Nunamaker 1989; Watson, DeSanctis

such as the Consensus Approach, will be sufficient to

and Poole 1988). One difficulty may be that when compre-

pron:ote coilsensus (agreen:ent) iii a group. Consensus is

hensive heuristics are implemented in computer systems,

the degree to which individual group members will make

they are typically not coupled with general heuristics. That

the same decision as the group following discussion.
Studies by Hall and Watson (1970), Nemiroff and King

is, the group is provided with a set of structural features
but given little or no general information on the spirit of
the heuristic. To improve effective use of computerized

3.1 Effects of Comprehensiveness

(1975), and Nemiroff, Passmore and Ford (1976) demonstrate that the Consensus Approach leads to higher levels
of group consensus than an unsupported, free interacting

heuristics, it may be important to enrich the specific

approach to decision making. This result is consistent with

heuristic by adding a general heuristic. This may be
particularly important when the heuristic is made available

the reasoning of the theories of social comparison (Fest-

for the group to use on their own, without extensive

training or use of a facilitator. From an adaptive structuration theory viewpoint, an explicit statement of the spirit
of the heuristic should encourage successful adoption of
the structural features made available to the group. We
can hypothesize that couplmg a spec(fic heittistic with an
appropriate general heuristic to a specific heuristic will

inger 1954) and persuasive arguments (Vinokur and
Burnstein 1974). Put in terms of adaptive structuration
theory, the spirit of the heuristic is sufficiently powerful to

promote participation and information sharing in the
group; a rich set of structural features is not required. The
Consensus Approach, which encourages the group to state
and explain their positions but gives few specific instructions on the steps for group discussion or the structure of

improve group consensus over use of the specific heuristic

alone.

argumentation, is a general heuristic that should be
adequate for promoting group consensus.

Presuming that both general and specific heuristics are
provided, how should they be presented to users? CatsBaril and Huber (1987, p. 351) have observed that "For
decision aids designed to address ill-structured problems,
it is not clear that computer delivety is useful. We could
find no evidence from the marketplace or from research
literature suggesting that this is the case.' It may be that

General heuristics can be simply stated -- usually in a page
or two of text -- and do not require computerization or
other elaborate means of presentation to decision makers.
How should more specific, comprehensive heuristics be
presented to users? For these heuristics to successfully
influence consensus, they must be used, and used properly,

merely presenting heuristics on a computer screen will not

by the group during discussion. Yet, when left to their
own devices, decision makers are known to resist or fail to

provide any added value over listing the heuristics on a
sheet of paper; but if a system is devised to interactively

fully use heuristics effectively for a variety of reasons,
including unfamiliarity with the decision method (novelty

facilitate use of the highly comprehensive heuristic
throughout the meeting, then itmay serve to ease the

of the new procedure and cognitive load associated with

cognitive load of the group as they adopt new decision

applying it) and a preference for including nonrational,

methods to replace old, preferred decision patterns (CatsBaril and Huber 1987; Howard 1988). There is some
preliminary evidence that this may indeed be the case
(Cats-Baril and Huber 1987). In short, the combination of
specific and general heuristics and interactive delivery

emotive elements in choice and judgment (DosSantos and

Bariff 1988; Zigurs, DeSanctis and Billingsley 1989;
Howard 1988). Indeed, the richer the heuristic in compre-

hensiveness, that is, the more structural features or

should provide the most effective support for group
decision making. So we hypothesize that 17 multiple

philosophical elements it contains, the more difficult the
adoption process may be. Given the difficulty of implementing comprehensive heuristics, what can be done to

heuristics are supplied to the group, such as a conibiliation of general and specific heuristics, then presenti,ig

encourage their successful use?
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them in an integrated, interactive fashion should improve

adaptive structuration terms, excessive restrictiveness may

tlzeir effectiveness over presenting them without such
integration.

cause groups to lose their sense of ownership and control
over the technology that is there to support them -- thus
reducing group consensus rather than enhancing it. But,

regardless of level of comprehensiveness, rest,iction
should help the group move smoothly through the struc3.2 Effects of Restrictiveness

tural features in the specific heuristic, discouraging group

members from "getting off the point" during discussion,
and thus reducing the time required to reach a decision.

In addition to coupling a general heuristic with a specific
heuristic and presenting the heuristics in interactive form,
successful adoption may also be affected by the degree of

restrictiveness in the implementation of the heuristic.
Supplemental heuristics represent external resources, or

4.

structures, that groups struggle to incorporate into already

In order to test the hypothesized effects of comprehensiveness and restriction in heuristics on consensus and

learned approaches to decision making (Poole and
DeSanctis 1989). Adaptive structuration theory would

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

decision time, a laboratory experiment
comparing consensus-seeking groups on
comprehensiveness and two levels of
resulting in a 3 X 2 factorial design.
treatment, constituting a control group,

predict that the way in which groups adjust to these novel

structures is highly variable, depending on the group's
cognitive interpretations of the structures, early experiences
with the structures, prevailing practices with related
structures, and so forth (Poole, Seibold and McPhee 1985).
Since the combination of these forces is unique in every

was conducted
three levels of
restrictiveness,
One additional
was conducted

subsequent to the study and will be described later.

Comprehensiveness was varied by providing groups with
either (a) a specific heuristic alone (referred to as the

group, adaptation to structures is idiosyncratic to the
group. Consequently, heuristics cannot be implemented in
a way that guarantees their effectiveness. Decision analysts

"specific alone" treatment), (b) both a specific and a

can, however, more or less channel group response to
structures by increasing their degree of restrictiveness

general heuristic -- presented together but not in an integrated form (the "coupled" treatment), or (c) an integrated
package containing both the specific and general heuristics
-- so that the two heuristics would appear as one highly

(Silver 1988).

comprehensive heuristic (the "integrated" treatment). The
specific heuristic consisted of a social judgment policy

To the extent that increased restrictiveness in the heuristic

encourages its full use (rather than partial use or abandonment) and channels effective learning of the heuristic
(Silver 1988), restrictiveness should reduce variance in
group adaptation and improve the probability of successful
adoption. On the other hand, we also know that many
groups are capable of reaching good decisions without
following a strict sequence of decision steps or proceeding
with a highly organized approach (Hirokawa 1985; Payne
and Bettman 1987); restrictiveness will not guarantee an
improvement in decision consensus - even if the restriction
is objectively rational and logically sound. The importance
of restricting execution of heuristics may be dependent

approach to decision making (Rohrbaugh 1981) that cued

groups to define and discuss the problem; identify and
weight criteria for evaluating alternative solutions to the
problem; consider alternative solutions to the problem; and
evaluate the alternatives using recursive rating, ranking,
and/or voting procedures, with intermittent discussion of
aggregated information. The features within the heuristic
were ordered to encourage divergent thinking (expansion

of the range of ideas to be considered) followed by
convergent thinking (reduction to a viable set of alternatives) (Abualsamh, Carlin and McDaniel in press),

upon the degree of comprehensiveness in the heuristic. If

consistent with the ordering of structural features within
Social Judgment Analysis (Rohrbaugh 1981), Rational
Reflection (Barnlund and Haiman 1960; Dewey 1910;
McBurney and Hance 1939), the Nominal Group Tech-

a set of structural features are provided to the group (i.e.,
a specific heuristic) witliout a general statement of
philosophy (i.e., an appropriate general heuristic), then

restriction may enhance the probability of successful
adoption of tlie heuristic. But adding an appropriate

nique (Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974), and the Noninter-

statement of philosophy (i.e., a general heuristic) may

features promote vigilant decision making (Janis and Mann
1977). The specific heuristic was made available through

actional method (Rodrigues 1984). Jointly these structural

reduce the needfor resbictiveness during implementation,
since the group will be less likely to bring in learned,

a computer system.

ineffective rules of deciding when this component is added
to the heuristic; the general heuristic cues them on how to
use the structural features of the specific heuristic without
constraining the way in which they employ these resources.

The Consensus Approach (Hall and Watson 1970) served
as the general heuristic. It consists of a general statement

That is, if the heuristic is adequate in communicating its

guidelines for achieving consensus. In the coupled treat-

of philosophy on the meaning of consensus and six general

ment, groups were provided with the specific heuristic and
the Consensus Approach. They were instructed to use
both heuristics in their decision process. In the integrated

spirit and structural features to the group, excessive
restrictiveness may be stifting to the group, prohibiting
active, constructive adaptation to the technology; in
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treatment, the heuristics were woven together to provide
an integrated package for the group.

43 The Computer System
All treatments accessed the specific heuristic through a

Restrictiveness was varied by instructing groups to either
(a) use all of the available structural features and apply
them in a sequential fashion until a decision was reached

computer system developed at the University of Minnesota
for support of group decision making (DeSanctis, Sambamurthy and Watson 1987). The system has been used in

(higher restrictiveness), or (b) select the features that
seemed most useful and apply them in any meaningful

prior studies of group judgment and choice (Dickson et al.

order (lower restrictiveness).

and DeSanctis 1988). For the current study, the computer

1989; Watson, DeSanctis and Poole 1988; Zigurs, Poole

system incorporated the features described in the Overview
above. To access the system, group members were seated
at a horseshoe-shaped table, with a terminal and display
screen for each group member and a large "public" viewing

4.1 Subjects
Experimental participants were 239 students enrolled in
upper division courses within a college of business at a
large midwestern university. On average the students were
25 years old, with 2.5 years of full-time work experience.
Many of the students were employed full-time in business
settings when the study was conducted, and most were
working at least part-time. The students were organized
into 56 groups of three, four, or five members who were

screen in front of the group. Individuals could enter
problem definitions, alternative definitions, weights, ranks,
and votes from their private terminals. The system then
performed the functions of recording, storing, and dis-

playing group ideas, comments, and aggregated (average
and ranges) voting information. The system is easy to use

and menu-driven and does not require a facilitator or
technician for operation.

working as business teams fur various class projects. The

teams were "live" groups in that they were actively working
together on class assignments at the time the study was

4.4 Procedure

conducted. The teams had met an average of seven times

prior to participating in the study, for an average of 1.57
hours per meeting. The teams participated in the study
voluntarily, and they received a modest number of course
points for their participation. Although the use of live
groups prohibited random assignment of subjects to
groups, prior research on group decision making indicated

The experimental procedure was as follows:

1.

Individuals listened to a standard introductory script
read by the experimenter, then read a background
statement for the Foundation Task.

2.

Individuals completed a consent form, a background

that whenever possible groups with a meaningful history

and future should be used for experimental research; in
this way the initial socialization that occurs early in group

questionnaire, and then allocated funds to a series of

formation can be avoided during the data collection
(Bormann 1970). Groups were randomly assigned to

five sets of six projects each that had requested
support from the philanthropic foundation. One of

experimental treatments.

these sets of six projects was used to calculate premeeting consensus for the group and served as the

42 The Consensus Task

task for the group decision in the next step of the
procedure. The other five sets were given to provide

'The Foundation Task," developed by Watson, DeSanctis

practice in the task and to help stabilize reasoning
processes.

and Poole (1988), served as the consensus task. This task

requires group members to allocate a sum of money
3.

among six competing projects that have requested funds

from a philanthropic foundation. Value conflict arises
because the team members have varying preference
structures that result in different allocation patterns. The
six projects that subjects can fund are based upon the six

personality components described by Spranger (1928):
theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social, political, and
religious. The task was validated against the Study of
Values instrument (Allport, Vernon and Lindzey 1970). It
is considered to be a difficult task because of its low
analyzability and because cause-effect relationships are not
clear (Ito and Peterson 1986; Van de Ven and Delbecq

Groups were given training in the heuristic associated
with their treatment. This involved going through a
packet of paper materials describing the features of
the heuristic and learning how to use the computer
system. Training time lasted approximately 40 minutes
in the specific treatment, 46 minutes in the coupled
treatment, and 48 minutes in the integrated treatment.
All groups were shown how to use each structural
feature of the heuristic in a sequential manner. High
restrictive treatments were instructed that they must

follow the same sequence during their group discussion
and use every structural feature, whereas low restrictive treatments were told that they could use the

1974). Validation data show that there is no solution that
will be equally acceptable to all interest groups involved
and that the task evokes very strong subject involvement

features in any order, and that they did not have to use

every structural feature in the course of their group
meeting.

(see Watson, DeSanctis and Poole 1988).
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4.

Groups allocated funds to the six projects requesting
support from the philanthropic trust.

5.

To determine post-meeting consensus, individuals
once again individually allocated funds to the six
projects requesting support from the philanthropic

Table 1 Mean Scores (and Standard Deviation and Cell Size)
on Post-meeting Consensus for Six Experimental Conditions

Comprehensiveness
Restrictiveness Specific
Alone

trust.

Specific +
General
Coupled

Specific +

.608

338

Overall

General
Integrated

5. RESULTS
Higher

To test for the hypothesized effects of comprehensiveness,
restrictiveness, and their interaction on group consensus,

a full-factorial analysis of covariance was conducted. Pre-

Lower

meeting consensus and group size were included as covariates. Levels of pre-meeting consensus were controlled in
accordance with findings of Castore and Murnighan (1978)
and Watson, DeSanctis and Poole (1988) that suggested an
interaction between pre-consensus and decision procedures
in predicting decision outcomes. Similarly, group size has

.417

(.16)
(N=10)

(N=9)

(N= 28)

.446

.647

.457

317

(.13)

(.23)

(.13)

(.16)

.431
(.14)
(N=19)

.628

.498

(.19)
(N=19)

(.17

(N=9)
Overall

.521
(.17

(.21)

(.15)
(N=9)

(N=9)

(N= 10)

(N=28)

.519

(.17)
(N=56)

(N= 18)

been found in some studies to be related to outcomes (e.g.

Hackman and Vidmar 1970; Holloman and Hendrick
1971; Thomas and Fink 1963). A probability value of less
than .05 was applied to all tests of statistical significance.

Table 3. Analysis of Covariance for Effects of Comprehensiveness
and Restrictiveness on Post-Meeting Consensus

Pre-meeting and post-meeting consensus were calculated
using the method developed by Spillman, Spillman and

df

MS

Bezdek (1980). This method produces a scale in the range

Within Cells

1223571

48

25491

F

p

of 0 to 1 where 1 implies complete agreement in the
group. Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive statistics for

Regression

327783

2

163891

6.43

.003*

each experimental treatment on measures of pre-meeting

Comprehensiveness 387486

and post-meeting consensus. Analysis of covariance
(Table 3) indicates a significant regression model, with

2

193742

7.6

.001*

Restrictiveness

1559

1

1559

.06

.806

significant effects associated with the comprehensiveness

Compr X Restr

25745

2

12872.50 .607

treatment and the group size covariate. A posteriori t
tests indicate that post consensus was significantly higher

in the coupled treatment than in either the high alone
(p =.04) or integrated treatments (p =.001). The larger the

Beta

t

P

Preconsensus

.183

1.3

.197

Groupsize

-78.38

-3.6

.001*

group, the lower the group's postconsensus (r = -.42,

p=.003).
Table 1. Mean Scores (and Standard Deviation and Cell Size)
on Pre-meeting Consensus for Six Experiniental Conditions

* p < .05

Comprehensiveness
Restrictiveness Specific
Aione

Specific +
General
Coupled

Specific +

These results suggest that the addition of the general
heuristic to the specific heuristic improved group consensus, as hypothesized. However, consensus was not
higher in the integrated treatment than in the coupled

Overall

General

Integrated

treatment. One potential explanation is that the groups in
Higher

.236
(.08)
(N=9)

.256
(.04)

.250
(.07)

(N=9)

(N=28)

.277
(.12)
(N=9)

.262

.254
(.08)
(N=9)

.264

(,09)
(N=10)

.268
(.11)
(N=19)

.249
(.08)

.260
(.09)
(N=10)

Lower

Overall

(N=19)

the coupled treatment relied on the general heuristic
rather than the specific heuristic to make their decision
(i. e., because the two heuristics were not integrated, they
ignored the specific heuristic during their discussion). To

(.10)

check this, we did several things.

(N=28)

computer system logs to test for differences across treat-

First, we analyzed

.255

.257

(.06)
(N=18)

(,08)

ments in their use of the specific heuristic's structural
features. Analysis of variance revealed no significant
differences in total feature use across treatments (F =.82,
df = 48,2, p =.445). Next we searched for differences in the

(N=56)
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Table 4. Mean Scores (and Standard Deviation and Cell Size}

types of features used by each treatment and discovered
that the integrated treatment used the criteria weighting

on Decision Time for Six Experimental Conditions

feature significantly more than either of the other two
Comprehensiveness

treatments (p=.03 for the coupled treatment; p=.003 for
the high alone treatment). This suggests that groups in the

integrated treatment engaged in more policy capturing
activity than the other two treatments -- a process that is

Restrictiveness Specific

more typically associated with decision quality than
consensus (Rohrbaugh 1981). The effort devoted to
discussion ofjudgment policies in the integrated treatment

Higher

may explain lower consensus in this group than in the
coupled treatment, but it still leaves the possibility that the

specific heuristic was somehow preventing groups from

Lower

achieving consensus. Did the specific heuristic get in the
way of groups achieving consensus? Although there was
no theoretical reason to expect this to be the case, we were
concerned that there might have been some problem in
our implementation of the specific heuristic in our computer system. We distributed the Foundation Task with
the general heuristic alone to 12 additional groups. We
then tested the null hypothesis of no difference between

6.

these control groups and the other experimental treatments. Post consensus was higher in the control groups
than in the high alone or integrated treatments; however,
analysis of variance revealed no difference between the

Specific +

Coupled

78.0
(03)
(N=10)

79.8

93.11

50.8

(31)
(N=9)

Overall

Specific +
General

General
Integrated

Alone

64.4
(1D
(N=19)

Overall

(22)

(10)

(N=9)

(N=9)

83.6
(11.D
(N=28)

92.0

99.3

80.7

(N= 10)

(N=9)

85.9
(15.3)
(N=19)

96.2

(8.D

(27

(18.5)

(N=18)

(22.2)
(N=28)

82.15
(16.9)
(N=56)

CONCLUSION

Consistent with social comparison theory and the theory of
persuasive arguments, this study showed that the addition
of an appropriate general heuristic to a computer delivery

control groups and the coupled treatment (F=.12, df=
19.1, p =.74). It seems that, although the general heuristic
enhanced decision consensus, the specific heuristic did not
detract from the groups' ability to achieve consensus.

of specific heuristics can bring dramatic improvements in
group consensus over the use of specific heuristics alone.
Within the adaptive structuration perspective, this means
that it is important for computer systems to emphasize the
spirit, or general ends and attitudes the technology aims to

The hypothesized effects of restrictiveness on consensus
were not observed. We had anticipated that greater

promote in the group, as well as the specific structural
features. Use of an integrated heuristic did not bring the
anticipated additional gain in group consensus, It may be
that our treatment created a heuristic that was so highly
comprehensive to groups that they found it to be overwhelming. The fact that these groups took longer on

restrictiveness would enhance consensus in the high alone
treatment more than in the other two treatments. In fact,
the only gain due to restrictiveness occurred in the inte-

grated treatment; here groups who used the heuristics with
more restriction experienced substantially more change in
consensus than those who were less restricted. It may be
that the highly comprehensive nature of the integrated
treatment was so overwhelming to groups that it was here

average to complete the decision task is evidence that this
may be the case. The data on decision time also indicated

that restrictiveness could lead to meaningful advantage. In

treatment may have been too detailed fur groups to
comfortably handle.

that groups in the integrated treatment benefited from
higher restrictiveness, again suggesting that the integrated

the other two treatments, groups were able to manage

quite effectively (at least in terms of our consensus
Overall the results of this study suggest that the dimensions

measure) without restriction in their use of the heuristics.
Higher restrictiveness did not improve effective use of the

of comprehensiveness and restrictiveness are useful
constructs in explaining the effects of decision aids on
group problem solving. Since computerization is generally
associated with the delivery of specific heuristics rather
than general ones, the findings of this study suggest that
the benefits of these heuristics are likely to be enhanced if
appropriate general heuristics are added during implementation. Designers also might consider adding general
heuristics to automated specific heuristics to make the
decision aids more palatable and cognitively understandable to users. Finally, the tradeoffs associated with
greater restrictiveness in delivery of heuristics to decision-

heuristics.

Higher restrictiveness did not bring consistent efficiency
gains to the groups. There was less variance in the higher

restrictiveness groups than in the other treatment, but
overall discussion time was actually higher in these groups

than in the less restrictive treatment (though not significantly so). When the heuristics included more than the
specific heuristic alone, restrictiveness did reduce decision
time. The greatest efficiency gain due to restrictiveness
was in the coupled treatment where higher restrictiveness
led to significantly lower decision time (see Table 4).

making groups pose interesting issues for further research
on the design of computer systems for group decision
making.
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